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Abstract
We address the scheduling problem of reordering an existing queue into its efficient order
through trade. To that end, we consider individually rational and balanced budget direct
and indirect mechanisms. We show that this class of mechanisms allows us to form efficient
queues provided that existing property rights for the service are small enough to enable
trade between the agents. In particular, we show on the one hand that no queue under
a fully deterministic service schedule such as first-come, first-serve can be dissolved effi-
ciently and meet our requirements. If, on the other hand, the alternative is service anarchy
(ie. a random queue), every existing queue can be transformed into an efficient order.
(JEL C72, D44, D82. Keywords: Scheduling, Queueing, Mechanism design.)
1 Introduction
We analyse the problem of organising efficient sequential access of a set of agents to some ser-
vice. All agents value the service equally but have a privately known waiting cost. We assume
that there is an inefficient waiting queue in place upon which we want to improve. Moreover,
efficient access is to be organised among the agents themselves, without payments from or to
∗Thanks for helpful discussions to BennyMoldovanu, Thomas Gall, Aner Sela, TimofiyMylovanov, andMotty
Perry. Financial support from the German Science Foundation through SFB/TR 15 is gratefully acknowledged.
†Corresponding author: tel +49 228 73 7993, fax +49 228 73 7940, Alex.Gershkov@uni-bonn.de.
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outsiders. Hence the class of mechanisms we are concerned with is that of the individually
rational and balanced budget mechanisms resulting in an efficient allocation. For fully deter-
ministic queues where agents are issued with non-probabilistic slot tickets, it is impossible to
achieve an efficient order using a mechanism from the above class. If, however, agents initially
face service anarchy, then they can mutually agree to implement the efficient order.
Economic applications of our model include the dynamic assignment of airport landing
and takeoff slots, the scheduling of trains through route bottlenecks and ships’ servicing at
sea ports, or any “control of vehicular traffic congestion” (Naor (1969)). Similarly, the joint
scheduling of jobs by different units on a corporate shop floor or the sequential access to re-
search facilities such as supercomputers, radio telescopes or laboratories fits our model well.
Leaving ethical considerations aside, a particularly interesting example arises in the waiting
system of the British National Health Service (NHS). There, patients for certain procedures
(such as nose operations, for example) are put on a waiting list with the ranking being based
on their doctors’ diagnoses. As a result, patients with the same diagnosis are treated first-
come, first-serve but may have differing and privately known waiting costs. ‘Private’ patients
often use the same facilities, doctors and staff, but are not subject to the same schedule. They
are typically treated without significant waiting and their payments are made to the service
provider. If trade between queue-positions in a single queue is possible, the payments made
by these private patients accrue to the other patients whose wait is prolonged through the
speedier servicing of the private patients. Thus the difference to our mechanism is in who gets
the money—the service provider or the other patients through our balanced budget require-
ment. Individual rationality of the mechanism is ensured through the universality principle of
the NHS: everyone is entitled to its services and may or may not accept the offered payments
for switching positions.
Another example arises with the potential short-term dynamic trade of airport landing and
takeoff slots.1 A short-term slot trading mechanism—for, say, one hour of takeoff or landing
activity in advance—is a scheduling problem since the set of arriving and departing airplanes
are known for the period considered. Ball, Donohue, and Hoffman (2006) argue for a near-real-
1 The 2000 AIR-21 Bill prescribes the total deregulation of slot controls at the following USHigh Density Rule air-
ports for 2007: New York John F Kennedy and LaGuardia, Chicago O’Hare and Washington Reagan National.
By that time, dynamic trading of slots between airlines will be possible.
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time market that allows for the trading of slots: “A key property of these slot-trading markets
is that each airline is potentially both a buyer and seller. In fact, the natural extension of the
current exchange system suggests simply adding the possibility of side payments to the current
trades.” Vindicating our balanced budget condition, they point out that the authorities running
airports are “almost always public agencies [and] typically restricted in that their charges for
services can only achieve cost recovery.”
We view our contribution as mapping two important results into the sphere of queuing.
Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), on the one hand, show the inexistence of efficient and in-
dividually rational trading mechanisms for a wide class of incomplete information problems
with asymmetric ownership distributions. On the other hand, Cramton, Gibbons, and Klem-
perer (1987) derive the contrary result that there can be efficient trade among a group of agents
provided that initial ownership is equally distributed. We show that the analogue of the for-
mer is any deterministic or, in particular, the first-come, first-serve (fcfs) schedule which can-
not be efficiently rescheduled and the analogue of latter is the random schedule which can
be rescheduled efficiently. Actually, the problem of efficiently reorganising a two player deter-
ministic queue is equivalent to the Myerson-Satterthwaite environment of efficient trade under
incomplete information.
Twowidely used service schedules are the first-come, first-serve procedure and the random
schedule. Since both these procedures are inefficient, we analyse whether there exists another
game which implements the efficient allocation and improves the utilities of all players in the
queue without making a budget deficit. While we show that such a game indeed exists for the
random scheduling, it does not exist for the fcfs scheduling or any other deterministic rule. By
a deterministic rule we mean a scheduling rule where an agent is served with probability one
at a particular slot. Throughout the paper we use the fcfs schedule as representative for any
such deterministic rule.
Related literature
Most of the existing literature analysing scheduling problems employing Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
(VCG) mechanisms ignores individual rationality. The exception is Mitra (2001) who assumes
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that individual rationality is with respect to not getting service at all. In contrast, we show
that efficient rescheduling is possible when the alternative is the random queue, ie. when the
probability of being served at any slot is equal among agents. We also show that rescheduling
is impossible when the alternative is any deterministic rule, as for instance fcfs. Individual
rationality with respect to some existing mechanism ensures that no agent is made worse off
through moving to the new mechanism.
Previous work on scheduling problems based on the VCG mechanism starts with Dolan
(1978). Suijs (1996) assumes linear cost (as we do) and shows that a VCG mechanism im-
plements the efficient order in dominant strategies and balances the budget. Strandenes and
Wolfstetter (2005) generalise over Dolan’s equal service time and linear cost assumptions. Mi-
tra (2002) shows that linear cost functions are the only cost functions which can lead to an
efficient allocation in dominant strategies, if budget balancedness is required. Hain and Mitra
(2004) allow for processing time to be private information. They identify the class of mecha-
nisms which lead to efficient allocation and budget balancedness in ex-post equilibrium. The
aforementioned analyse VCG mechanisms but do not impose individual rationality with re-
spect to an existing mechanism. Krishna and Perry (1997) analyse a general problem allowing
for a mechanism which has an equilibrium featuring an efficient allocation while balancing its
budget and being individually rational. An application of their results to our setting, however,
is not a simple task. This is not meant to diminish their contribution as their environment and
mechanism are much more general than ours.
The queueing literature studies the aspect of our problem that arriving customers can gain
priority over others through a single one-off payment to the service provider under the head-
ing of ‘priority pricing.’ Hassin and Haviv (2002) survey the recent queueing literature in-
cluding models where the queueing agents offer payments to the service provider. Afe`che
and Mendelson (2004) analyse queues where the delay cost depends on the service valuation
and use auctions to allocate priority. They introduce a multiplicative structure linking delay
costs with valuations over the typically additive formulation in the literature following Naor
(1969). Kittsteiner andMoldovanu (2005) study priority auctions allowing for private informa-
tion on processing time. Mitra (2001) is a mechanism design approach aiming at the identifi-
cation of cost functions for which queues can be efficiently reorganised in dominant strategies
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while balancing the budget. He further derives a subset of individually rational cost functions
where non-participation means obtaining no service at all. Recent cooperative approaches to
queueing where the assigned positions and payments are based on the Shapley value include
Maniquet (2004) and Mishra and Rangarajan (2005). The equally cooperative literature on se-
quencing games studies the problem of sharing the cost gains in moving from an initially given
queue to some optimal ordering. It was surveyed recently by Curiel, Hamers, and Klijn (2002)
and focuses on the existence and properties of the cooperative games’ core.
We can alternatively take the point of view of matching theory. We may simply drop our
interpretation of the private information as waiting cost and the queue as a waiting device and
think about the queue as a general ranking of the type with our cost function discriminating be-
tween the assigned objects.2 From this point of view, our game is an instance of the assignment
game with transferable utility due to Shapley and Shubik (1972) under incomplete information
with side payments within the set of agents. Our problem thus resembles the multi-item auc-
tions problem solved in dominant strategies by Demange, Gale, and Sotomayor (1986) with
the additional constraint of balancing the budget for goods which can be ranked on a single
dimension. More specifically, our mechanism can be applied to the problem of the assignment
of universally ranked dorm rooms with existing tenants or the allocation of places at univer-
sally ranked schools or universities. These or similar problems have been recently analysed in
a strictly nontransferable utility setting—and thus contrasting our analysis—by Abdulkadiroglu
and So¨nmez (2003) and So¨nmez and U¨nver (2005) among others. Extending existing results,
our mechanism allows for the gains from trade between agents to be realised even when agents
have the same ranking over the available objects.
The following section introduces the model. In section 3 we develop the direct revelation
game and in section 4 we construct an indirect game implementing the efficient queue. All
proofs and details are contained in the appendix.
2 Our particular specification of the linear cost, unit processing time and the ‘ideal’ object’s valuation need not fit
well with other interpretations than the above quoted school assignment and dormitory allocation examples.
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2 The model
There is a setN of n > 1 players willing to get some specific service valued at V . Although the
service is valuable, every player incurs a cost of waiting to get the service. More precisely, for
i ∈ N , we assume that player i’s utility from getting the service at the kth period is V − kθi − p
where p is a monetary payment by agent i and θi is waiting cost per one unit of time.
3 The
server can serve only one player at each point in time. Waiting cost θi ∈ Θi = [0, 1] is private
information and independently distributed with density f and distribution function F . Finally,
we assume that processing time of any player is the same and normalised to 1 period.
Themechanism designer wishes to implement the efficient order of service, which coincides
with a decreasing ranking of the waiting cost. This maximises the aggregated expected utility
of the players. By the revelation principle we may restrict attention to direct revelation mecha-
nisms, where the players have to reveal only their private information to the designer. Denote
by Θ = [0, 1]n the type space and by θ, any element of Θ. The mechanismM has to specify two
things: The payment that each player should pay and the (possibly stochastic) order of getting
the service. Therefore a direct revelation mechanism is a vector of payments pM =
〈
pMi
〉n
i=1
and
the order σM =
〈
σMij
〉n
i,j=1
, where
pMi : Θ → R
is bidder i’s payment and for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k
σMij (θ) : Θ → [0, 1]
specifies the probability that agent i is served at the jth period. Consequently we have
∑
i σ
M
ij =
1 for each j and
∑
j σ
M
ij = 1 for each i. Therefore, expected utility of the player i who observes
signal θi (while the rest of the players observe signals θ−i), if all players report their observed
signals correctly is
Ui (θi) = V −
n∑
k=1
σMik (θ)kθi − p
M
i (θ)
where θ = (θi, θ−i). Denote byW
M
i (θi) and P
M
i (θi) the expected waiting time and the payment
3 As customary in the literature, we do not consider discounting of payments.
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by player i if θi is the reported delay cost. That is
PMi (θi) = Eθ−i p
M
i (θ) , W
M
i (θi) =
n∑
k=1
k Eθ−i σ
M
ik (θ).
The mechanismM is incentive compatible if, for any i and any θi, θˆi ∈ [0, 1], it is true that
−WMi (θi)θi − P
M
i (θi) ≥ −W
M
i (θˆi)θi − P
M
i (θˆi).
Three possible service schedules are of interest to us: a stochastic order, a deterministic sched-
ule determined through something other than the private information and the efficient order.
1. Random order. In this discipline each player can be at any position with equal probability.
That is
σranik (θ) =
1
n
for any i, k, θ.
2. First-come, first-serve order. In this case, each player is served according to deterministic or-
der based on some exogenous parameter (unrelated to the waiting costs), like the arrival
time. That is, for any player i there exists a unique position l such that
σfcfsik (θ) =


1 if l = k
0 otherwise.
3. Efficient order. In this case, players get the service based on decreasing waiting cost, ie.
σefik (θ) =


1 if |{j : θj > θi}| = k and |{j 6= i : θj = θi}| = 0
1
m
if |{j : θj > θi}| = l and |{j 6= i : θj = θi}| = m 6= 0, where l +m ≥ k > l
0 otherwise
where |S| is the number of elements in set S.
In the following we deal with the question of which kind of schedule can be improved upon
in the mutual interest. Hence we analyse the question whether there exists a game that induces
the efficient allocation, provides all types of all players with expected utilities higher then the
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one obtained in the random or fcfs order while balancing the budget ex post.4
3 Direct mechanisms
The first lemma specifies necessary and sufficient conditions for the mechanism to be incentive
compatible. In particular, it says that in any incentive compatible mechanism, increasing the
delay cost should lead to earlier service and higher payment of that player. This is similar
to a standard result in auction theory (Myerson (1981), among others) that says that in any
incentive compatible mechanism, the probability to get the object increases with a player’s
valuation. Since the proofs for lemmata 1–4 are standard, they are omitted.5
Lemma 1. The mechanism M =
〈
pM , σM
〉
is incentive compatible iff for every i ∈ N and all θ, θ ∈
[0, 1],WMi is decreasing and
PMi (θ)− P
M
i (θ) =
∫ θ
θ
sdWMi (s). (1)
The players prefer to adopt any newmechanism if it provides themwith higher utility then
the original mechanism. Hence we check whether our proposed mechanism is individually
rational when the outside option is either the random scheduling or the first-come, first-serve
order. The next lemma specifies the type of each player who gains least among all possible
types of that player by moving to our mechanism
〈
pM , σM
〉
. More precisely, it says that the net
utility is minimised for the type of player who on average stays at the same position.
Lemma 2. Given an incentive compatible mechanismM =
〈
pM , σM
〉
, player i’s net utility with respect
to mechanism Z is minimised at
θ∗i (Z) =
1
2
[inf Θ∗i (Z) + supΘ
∗
i (Z)] ∈ [0, 1] (2)
where Θ∗i (Z) =
{
θi|Wi(θj) < W
Z
i (θi)∀θj < θi;Wi(θk) > W
Z
i (θi)∀θk > θi
}
and Z ∈ {ran, fcfs}.
In the next lemma we derive a condition for any incentive compatible mechanism to be
individually rational.
4 It is easy to relax our balanced budget condition to allow for a surplus if that should be desired.
5 For complete proofs of very similar statements see Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer (1987).
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Lemma 3. An incentive compatible mechanismM =
〈
pM , σM
〉
is individually rational with respect to
mechanism Z ∈ {ran, fcfs} iff, for all i ∈ N and θ∗i (Z) as defined in the previous lemma,
PMi (θ
∗
i (Z)) ≤ 0. (3)
The mechanism satisfies budget balance if
∑n
i=1 p
M
i (θ) = 0. The next lemma specifies a
condition for the budget to balance in the mechanism that satisfies incentive compatibility and
individual rationality.
Lemma 4. For any expected waiting time WMi (θi) which is decreasing for all i ∈ N , there exists a
transfer function pM such that
〈
pM , σM
〉
is incentive compatible, individually rational with respect to
mechanism Z ∈ {ran, fcfs} and budget balanced iff, for θ∗i (Z) defined in lemma 2
n∑
i=1
[∫ θ∗
i
(Z)
0
sF (s)dWMi (s)−
∫ 1
θ∗
i
(Z)
s(1− F (s))dWMi (s)
]
≥ 0. (4)
Now we start the analysis of the properties of the efficient schedule.
Lemma 5. In the efficient schedule, type θi’s expected waiting time is
W efi (θi) = n+ (1− n)F (θi). (5)
In the following we refer to the efficient queuing schedule as implementable with respect
to any other discipline Z, if and only if there exists a mechanism
〈
pM , σef
〉
which is incentive
compatible, individually rational (with respect to Z) and budget balanced. The next theorem
follows from the last lemma and lemma 4.
Theorem 1. Efficient scheduling is implementable with respect to schedule Z ∈ {ran, fcfs} iff
n∑
i=1
[∫ θ∗
i
(Z)
0
sF (s)f(s)ds−
∫ 1
θ∗
i
(Z)
s(1− F (s))f(s)ds
]
≤ 0 (6)
where θ∗i (Z) =


F−1
(
n−k
n−1
)
if Z = fcfs
F−1 (1/2) if Z = ran
and k is the position of player i in the fcfs schedule.
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Notice that the worst possible type in fcfs depends on the position of the player in the initial
order. The next proposition shows that for an initially random schedule, it is always possible
to reschedule efficiently.
Proposition 2. For any distribution of types F , the efficient scheduling is implementable with respect
to the random order.
As we show in the following proposition, the opposite holds if the initial schedule is fcfs.
Proposition 3. For any distribution of types F , the efficient scheduling is not implementable with
respect to first-come, first-serve order.
It is the existing property rights in a service slot which explain the difference between the
different outside option mechanisms. The key difference between the random and fcfs initial
schedules is that the fcfs order gives players full possession over their time of service (with
probability one) while the random order only issues a probabilistic ticket. This concentration
of property rights on a single service ticket which comes with the fcfs schedule makes it impos-
sible to efficiently reschedule the queue. The reason is that the agent who is to be served first
in the initial schedule knows that he will not ‘buy forward’ (ie. get earlier service) for sure and
thus will not exchange his slot with a marginally higher type behind him for a merely marginal
payment.
As follows from the previous results, the insertion of some uncertainty into a deterministic
queue (thus making it stochastic) makes efficient rescheduling possible. For instance, consider
a lottery which results with probability p in the random queue and probability 1 − p the fcfs
queue. Let this lottery be executed if at least one player disagrees in participating in the efficient
mechanism. Since the worst-off type in the lottery is continuous in p, for p sufficiently high,
there exists an equilibrium where the efficient allocation is implemented.
4 An efficient indirect mechanism
As an illustration of our prior results, we now analyse an auction game that implements the
efficient schedule. The auction’s basic structure is given by the following properties:
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• each player i offers some payment for being served in each position of the queue, ie. each
player offers an n-vector of bids,
• we assign queue positions s = 1, . . . , n in increasing order; the highest bidder for position
s gets this position and pays the own bid for this slot;6 the assigned bidder’s bids are
removed from subsequent slot-allocations,
• every slot’s payment is shared in equal amounts by all other players.
Notice that an agent’s bid for the kth slot is relevant only if the bidder did not secure service
at any previous slot. Thus given that an agent is still unassigned, he ignores all previous pro-
ceedings when deciding on his kth bid. Therefore, if all bidders’ bidding function is given by
the increasing function βk (θj), then agent i submits the bid b for the k
th slot which maximises
Πki (b
k) = pr(b > max
j∈S
{
βk(θj)
}
)E
[
−b− kθi + L
W
∣∣ b > max
j∈S
{
βk(θj)
}
] +
pr(b < max
j∈S
{
βk(θj)
}
)E
[
max
{
βk(θj)
}
n− 1
+ LL
∣∣∣∣∣ b < maxj∈S {βk(θj)}]
where
LW :=
∑
l>k
max
{
β˜l(θj)
}
n− 1
, LL := Πk+1i (b
k+1)
and β˜l(θj) is the winning bid for slot l. S is the set of the n− k opponents with the lowest types
among n− 1 players, other than i. Notice that the above Πki (·) is not agent i’s utility. However,
if we want to write agent i’s utility as a function only of bids for slot k, we obtain an expression
like A+BΠki (·), where A and B only depend on the bids for the slots previous to k.
Proposition 4. An equilibrium bidding function of the indirect game described above is increasing in
the agent’s type and is given by
βk(θi) =
(∫ θi
0
(−kx− LL + LW )
(∫ x
0
F˜k(θj)dθj
) 1
n−1
F˜k(x)dx
)(∫ θi
0
F˜k(θj)dθj
)− n
n−1
(7)
6 Ties are broken with equal probability among winners.
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for k = 1, ..., n− 1, where
F˜k(θj) = (F (θj))
n−k
k−1∑
j=0

 n− k + j − 1
n− k − 1

 (1− F (θj))j
is the distribution of the n− k highest order statistic among n− 1 variables.
Note that an agent’s payment consists of two parts: He gets the average winning bid of all
slots assigned to other players and he pays his own bid for the position at which he is served.
Since βk(θi) is an increasing function, this mechanism leads to the efficient allocation.
Conclusion
In this paper we analyse the possibility of rearranging an existing queue into its efficient or-
der through voluntary trade between the queuing agents. Desirable generalisations are over
the linear waiting cost and the equal (unit) processing time assumptions. Well known existing
results, however, make us pessimistic about the prospects of such generalisations. Another po-
tential generalisation is to extend the model with a stream of stochastically arriving customers
and thus turn the scheduling problem into a queueing problem. This will create technical diffi-
culties, but our main conclusion that too strong property rights prevent efficient reordering of
the queue will remain in place. Allowing for agents’ private information on the time required
to complete the service does not make the model more interesting, since this information will
be revealed and can be conditioned upon. In case of misrepresenting the service time, fines can
be imposed.
Appendix
Proof of lemma 5. In efficient scheduling, the expected waiting time of type θi is given by
W efi (θi) =
n∑
i=1
i
(
n− 1
i− 1
)
(F (θi))
n−i(1− F (θi))
i−1 = n+ (1− n)F (θi)
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where the second equality follows from the expectation of the binomial distribution where the
success probability of each trial is 1−F (θi), the number of trials is n−1, and i−1 is the number
of successes.
Proof of theorem 1. Inserting (5) into (4) results in (6). The waiting time in the fcfs schedule
for position i is given by i. Thus the worst-off type θ∗i (fcfs) is
n+ (1− n)F (θ∗i (fcfs)) = i or F (θ
∗
i (fcfs)) =
i− n
1− n
and θ∗i (fcfs) = F
−1
(
n− i
n− 1
)
.
Waiting time in the random queue is
1
n
1 +
1
n
2 + · · ·+
1
n
n =
1
n
n∑
i=1
i =
1
n
(
n2 + n
2
)
=
n+ 1
2
and thus the worst-off type θ∗(ran) solves
n+ (1− n)F (θ∗(ran)) =
n+ 1
2
or θ∗(ran) = F−1(1/2).
Proof of proposition 2. We have to show that, for θ∗ = F−1 (1/2),
(1− n)
[∫ θ∗
0
θF (θ)f(θ)dθ −
∫ 1
θ∗
θ(1− F (θ))f(θ)dθ
]
≥ 0.
Integration by parts of the first expression between brackets gives
∫ θ∗
0
θF (θ)f(θ)dθ = θ(F (θ))2
∣∣∣∣
θ∗
0
−
∫ θ∗
0
θF (θ)f(θ)dθ −
∫ θ∗
0
(F (θ))2dθ (8)
and integrating the second expression by parts gives
∫ 1
θ∗
θ(1− F (θ))f(θ)dθ = −θ(1− F (θ))2
∣∣∣∣
1
θ∗
−
∫ 1
θ∗
θ(1− F (θ))f(θ)dθ +
∫ 1
θ∗
(1− F (θ))2dθ.
Therefore we can rewrite the original expression as
(1− n)
[
−
∫ θ∗
0
(F (θ))2
2
dθ −
∫ 1
θ∗
(1− F (θ))2
2
dθ
]
≥ 0.
13
Proof of proposition 3. Without loss of generality and for notational simplicity we will as-
sume that player i is served in position i in the initial fcfs schedule. We rewrite (6) as claim of
non-implementability as
n∑
i=1
[∫ 1
0
θF (θ)f(θ)dθ −
∫ 1
θ∗
i
θf(θ)dθ
]
> 0, for θ∗i = F
−1
(
n− i
n− 1
)
.
Using (8) on the first term in brackets and integration by parts on the second term gives
−
n
2
−
n
2
∫ 1
0
(F (θ))2dθ +
n∑
i=1
[∫ 1
θ∗
i
F (θ)dθ + θ∗i
n− i
n− 1
]
> 0
which transforms into
pi (F (θ)) :=
n∑
i=1
[∫ 1
θ∗
i
F (θ)−
n− i
n− 1
]
dθ −
n
2
∫ 1
0
(F (θ))2dθ > 0
since ∫ 1
θ∗
i
n− i
n− 1
dθ =
n− i
n− 1
(1− θ∗) and
n∑
i=1
n− i
n− 1
=
n
2
.
For any distribution of types F [θ], we can thus rewrite (6) as the claim that pi (F (θ)) > 0. Now
define a distribution F ∗(θ), which puts all probability mass at the single point A ∈ [0, 1] and
thus removes all uncertainty about the agent’s type. Below we show that for any distribution
F (θ) that is different from F ∗(θ), it is true that
pi (F (θ)) > pi (F ∗(θ)) , where F ∗(θ) =


0 if θ < A
1 if θ ≥ A
. (9)
Since pi (F ∗(θ)) = n (1− A) − (1− A)
n∑
i=1
n− i
n− 1
−
n
2
(1− A) = 0 for any A ∈ [0, 1], this would
complete our proof. We show (9) in two steps. In the first step we show that, for any distribu-
tion function F (θ), it is true that
pi (F (θ)) > pi
(
Fˆ (θ)
)
where Fˆ (θ) is a distribution function that has no positive measure with positive density and
has at most n − 1 mass points (ie. a discrete distribution). In the second step we show that
14
gathering any two mass points from Fˆ (θ) into a single mass point must decrease pi.
0 1
1
θ
n−i−1
n−1
n−i
n−1
θ∗i+1 θ
∗
i
F (θ)
bi
F (θ)
0 1
1
θ
n−i−2
n−1
n−i
n−1
bi+1 bi
F (θ)
bi
F (θ)
0 1
1
θ
1
n−1
1
n−1
1
n−1
1
n−1
1
n−1
bi+1 bi
F (θ)
bi
F (θ)
Figure 1: Step 1 (left): The area under the solid F (θ) is replaced by the equally sized rectangle under
the dashed F (θ). Step 2 (centre): Combining two steps of the solid F (θ) into a single step of equivalent
‘virtual’ weight. Right: Redistributing a double mass point in F (θ) into its neighbours.
Step 1. Since in the following we will change the distribution function, denote by θ∗i (F ) the worst
type of player i if the underlying probability is F , which was specified in lemma 2. In this
step we show that if, for some i, θ∗i+1(F ) < θ
∗
i (F ) then pi (F (θ)) > pi
(
F (θ)
)
where F (θ) is
defined in the following way
F (θ) =


F (θ) if θ < θ∗i+1(F ) or θ ≥ θ
∗
i (F )
F (θ∗i+1) if θ
∗
i+1(F ) ≤ θ < bi
F (θ∗i ) if bi ≤ θ < θ
∗
i (F )
and bi is the solution to
1
n− 1
(
F−1
(
n− i
n− 1
)
− bi
)
=
∫ F−1( n−i
n−1
)
F−1(n−i−1
n−1
)
(
F (θ)−
n− i− 1
n− 1
)
dθ.
Notice that the boundary points θ∗ of the newdistributionF (θ) coincide: θ∗i (F ) = θ
∗
i+1
(
F
)
=
bi. By choice of bi the first term of pi
(
F (θ)
)
does not change, while the change in the sec-
ond term is
∫ 1
0
F (θ)2dθ −
∫ 1
0
F (θ)2dθ =
∫ F−1( n−i
n−1
)
F−1(n−i−1
n−1
)
F (θ)2dθ−
((
bi − F
−1
(
n− i− 1
n− 1
))(
n− i− 1
n− 1
)2
+
(
F−1
(
n− i
n− 1
)
− bi
)(
n− i
n− 1
)2)
.
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Below we show that
∫ 1
0
F (θ)2dθ −
∫ 1
0
F (θ)2dθ is negative. Notice that the second line of
the previous expression can be rewritten as
(
n− i− 1
n− 1
)2(
F−1
(
n− i
n− 1
)
− F−1
(
n− i− 1
n− 1
))
+
1
(n− 1)2
(
F−1
(
n− i
n− 1
)
− bi
)
+
2 (n− i− 1)
(n− 1)2
(
F−1
(
n− i
n− 1
)
− bi
)
=
(
n− i− 1
n− 1
)2(
F−1
(
n− i
n− 1
)
− F−1
(
n− i− 1
n− 1
))
+
2n− 2i− 1
(n− 1)
∫ F−1( n−i
n−1
)
F−1(n−i−1
n−1
)
(
F (θ)−
n− i− 1
n− 1
)
dθ.
Therefore, we can rewrite
∫ 1
0
F (θ)2dθ −
∫ 1
0
F (θ)2dθ as follows
∫ F−1( n−i
n−1
)
F−1(n−i−1
n−1
)
F (θ)
(
F (θ)−
2n− 2i− 1
(n− 1)
)
dθ +
(
F−1
(
n− i
n− 1
)
− F−1
(
n− i− 1
n− 1
))(
(n− i− 1) (2n− 2i− 1)− (n− i− 1)2
(n− 1)2
)
=
∫ F−1( n−i
n−1
)
F−1(n−i−1
n−1
)
F (θ)
(
F (θ)−
2n− 2i− 1
(n− 1)
)
dθ +
(
F−1
(
n− i
n− 1
)
− F−1
(
n− i− 1
n− 1
))
(n− i− 1) (n− i)
(n− 1)2
.
Notice that since
max
x∈[n−i−1
n−1
, n−i
n−1
]
x
(
x−
2n− 2i− 1
(n− 1)
)(
F−1
(
n− i
n− 1
)
− F−1
(
n− i− 1
n− 1
))
>
∫ F−1( n−i
n−1
)
F−1(n−i−1
n−1
)
F (θ)
(
F (θ)−
2n− 2i− 1
(n− 1)
)
dθ
it is sufficient to show that
max
x∈[n−i−1
n−1
, n−i
n−1
]
x
(
x−
2n− 2i− 1
(n− 1)
)(
F−1
(
n− i
n− 1
)
− F−1
(
n− i− 1
n− 1
))
+
(
F−1
(
n− i
n− 1
)
− F−1
(
n− i− 1
n− 1
))
(n− i− 1) (n− i)
(n− 1)2
≤ 0.
Since for
x =
n− i− 1
n− 1
and x =
n− i
n− 1
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the expression above is zero, we are done. Our argument allows us to restrict attention
to distributions which have at most n− 1mass points where the probability of any mass
point is k/(n− 1)where k is natural number.
Step 2. Note that step 1 allows us to restrict attention to discrete distributions with n − 1 mass
points. After step 1, every mass point has probability 1/(n− 1).
Since pi (F (θ)) is continuous in bi and 1 ≥ bi−1 ≥ bi ≥ bi+1 ≥ 0, we can conclude that there
exist b∗1 ≥ . . . ≥ b
∗
n−1 that minimises pi (F (θ)). To complete the proof, we show that if there
is an i such that bi > bi+1, then pi (F (θ)) > pi
(
F (θ)
)
where F (θ) is defined as
F (θ) =


F (θ) if θ < bi+1 or θ ≥ bi
n−i−2
n−1
if bi+1 ≤ θ < bi
n−i
n−1
if bi ≤ θ < bi
and bi is given by
(
bi − bi+1
)
(n− i− 1) =
(
bi − bi
)
(n− i) or
bi =
bi (n− i) + bi+1 (n− i− 1)
2n− 2i− 1
.
Similarly to the first step, this change does not affect first term of pi. Note that
∫ 1
0
F (θ)2dθ −
∫ 1
0
F (θ)2dθ
=
(
n− i− 1
n− 1
)2
(bi − bi+1)−
(
n− i− 2
n− 1
)2 (
bi − bi+1
)
−
(
n− i
n− 1
)2 (
bi − bi
)
=
(
n− i− 1
n− 1
)2
(bi − bi+1)−
(
n− i− 1
n− 1
)2 (
bi − bi+1
)
−
(
n− i− 1
n− 1
)2 (
bi − bi
)
−
1− 2(n− i− 1)
(n− 1)2
(
bi − bi+1
)
−
1 + 2(n− i− 1)
(n− 1)2
(
bi − bi
)
= −
1
(n− 1)2
(bi − bi+1)−
2(n− i− 1)
(n− 1)2
(
bi + bi+1 − 2bi
)
.
Plugging the definition of bi into the last expression gives us
−
1
(n− 1)2
(bi − bi+1) +
2(n− i− 1)
(n− 1)2
bi − bi+1
2n− 2i− 1
= −
bi − bi+1
(n− 1)2
[
1−
2(n− i− 1)
2n− 2i− 1
]
< 0
which completes the argument. Notice that after the first application of step 2, the com-
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bined mass point has probability mass of 2/(n − 1). In order to be able to apply step 2
again, one can think of this one point as actually consisting of two mass points of equal
probability of 1/(n − 1) each. Reapplying step 2 to combine these into their respective
neighbouring mass points then makes no problems. This is illustrated in the right hand
panel of figure 1.
Proof of proposition 4. Agent i chooses b to maximise
Πki (b
k) = pr(b > max
j∈S
{
βk(θj)
}
)E
[
−b− kθi + L
W
∣∣ b > max
j∈S
{
βk(θj)
}
]+
pr(b < max
j∈S
{
βk(θj)
}
)E
[
max
{
βk(θj)
}
n− 1
+ LL
∣∣∣∣∣ b < maxj∈S {βk(θj)}
]
(10)
where LW :=
∑
l>k
max
{
β˜l(θj)
}
n− 1
, and LL := Πk+1i (b
k+1).
LW can be interpreted as the slot k winner’s utility from the opponents’ payments for the slots
auctioned after k. LL is the expected utility a bidder who does not win slot k (or any previ-
ous slot) gets from the auctioning of slots after k. Since bidding functions are monotonically
increasing, we know that pr(b > max
j∈S
{
βk(θj)
}
) =
F˜k(β
k−1(b)) := pr(θj < β
k−1(b)∀j ∈ S) = (F (βk
−1
(b)))n−k
k−1∑
j=0

 n− k + j − 1
n− k − 1

(1− F (βk−1(b)))j .
Using this notation, we can rewrite (10) as
Πki (b
k) =
∫ βk−1(b)
0
(−b− kθi + L
W )F˜k(θj)dθj +
∫ 1
βk
−1(b)
(
βk(θj)
n− 1
+ LL
)
F˜k(θj)dθj.
Maximising wrt b gives
∂Πki (b
k)
∂b
= −
∫ βk−1(b)
0
F˜k(θj)dθj + (−b− kθi + L
W )F˜k(β
k−1(b))
1
βk ′(θˆ)
−
(
b
n− 1
+ LL
)
F˜k(β
k−1(b))
1
βk ′(θˆ)
= 0
(11)
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where θˆ is such that βk(θˆ) = b. This transforms into the ordinary differential equation
−
∫ βk−1(b)
0
F˜ (θj)dθj −
(
b+ kθi +
b
n− 1
+ LL − LW
)
F˜ (βk
−1
(b))
βk ′(θˆ)
= 0. (12)
A solution to this is obtained (for the initial condition of b(0) = 0) as
βk(θi) =
(∫ θi
0
(−kx− LL + LW )
(∫ x
0
F˜ (θj)dθj
) 1
n−1
F˜ (x)dx
)(∫ θi
0
F˜ (θj)dθj
)− n
n−1
which equals (7). Checking the slope of this bidding function gives
∂βk(bk)
∂θi
=
(
−kθi − L
L + LW
)(∫ θi
0
F˜ (θj)dθj
) 1
n−1
F (θi)dθi
(∫ θi
0
F˜ (θj)dθj
)− n
n−1
+
(
F˜ (θi)
)
−
n
n−1
∫ θi
0
(−kx− LL + LW )
(∫ x
0
F˜ (θj)dθj
) 1
n−1
F˜ (x)dx
(13)
where each constituent component is positive, since LW > LL + kθi.
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